Contracting under Reciprocal Altruism

Oleg Shchetinin

No 09-078, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: I develop a model of reciprocal altruism which accounts for some evidence in contracting situations, which are paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical contract theory with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect, observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the Control Game the model predicts that an equilibrium can exhibit ”no effect of control”, ”hidden cost of control”, or ”positive effect of control”, depending on the characteristics of the actors, as observed in the experiments. This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could be fruitful more generally in applications of contract theory.

Keywords: contract theory; signaling; behavioral economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism (2009)
Working Paper: Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:22188

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