choice of remuneration regime in fisheries: the case of Hawaii’s longline fisheries

Quang Nguyen

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: One of the most prominent features of remuneration in the Hawaii’s longline fisheries industry has been the norm of share contract regimes. This paper investigates whether the use of share contract regime is positively correlated to increased economic returns. The principal-agent framework is applied to develop a theoretical model for the remuneration choice. Empirical estimation is conducted using a switching regression model that accounts for certain vessel characteristics effects on revenue, depending on remuneration regime used (i.e., share contract or flat wage), as well as the potential selection bias in the vessels’ contractual choice. Key findings from counterfactual simulations indicate: (1) a negative selection into choosing share contracts, and (2) that flat wage vessels would experience significantly higher revenues if they switch to share contracts. Thus, even though the labor market in Hawaii’s longline fisheries relies upon foreign crew members, the results suggest that it would benefit owners of flat wage vessels to apply share contracts to increase their revenues.

Keywords: Remuneration Regime; Longline Fisheries; Hawaii; Commercial Fisheries; Lay System; Crew Shares; Labor Contracts; Incentive Systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B21 C21 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Choice of Remuneration Regime in Fisheries: The Case of Hawaii’s Longline Fisheries (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:13792

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