An Attempt to Control Tax Evasion

Antonio Rosato

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The main object of this paper is the study of tax evasion from a theoretical point of view. We construct a simple two-player model in order to analyze the interaction between the taxpayer and the IRS and the main tool we use is game theory. We derive equilibrium solutions for the static game and we also provide some interesting comparative statics results. Then, we develop a dynamic game over an infinite number of periods. We show and comment two different kinds of long-run equlibria.

Keywords: Tax Evasion; Policy; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C72 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07-06, Revised 2009-05-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:15084

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