Ownership Structure and Efficiency in Large Economies

Camelia Bejan and Florin Bidian

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders' interests. We show that the efficiency of the limit allocation depends on how firms' shares are distributed across consumers, and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit.

Keywords: the objective of the firm; oligopolistic competition; ownership structure; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 D21 D43 D51 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:17677

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