EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies

Camelia Bejan and Florin Bidian

Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 50, issue 3, 602 pages

Abstract: We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders’ interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms’ shares across consumers and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Firm’s objective; Strategic foundations of competitive equilibrium; Ownership structure; D21; D43; D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-010-0585-3 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Ownership Structure and Efficiency in Large Economies (2009) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:50:y:2012:i:3:p:571-602

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0585-3

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:50:y:2012:i:3:p:571-602