Sustaining cooperation in trust games

Mary Rigdon, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. In the control comparisons, Players 1 are randomly repaired with Players 2 without regard to type. We ask: are there natural tendencies for people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience more cooperation in comparison with controls?

Keywords: exchange; trust; reciprocity; cooperation; clustering; bargaining; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D0 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-08, Revised 2006-04-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games (2007)
Working Paper: Sustaining Cooperation in trust Games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:2006

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