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Sustaining Cooperation in trust Games

Kevin McCabe (), Mary Rigdon () and Vernon Smith

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Players are typed based on their recent track record as whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. The empirical question we address is whether this adaptation of clustering to bargaining environments sustains cooperative play analogous to the situation in finitely repeated PD games.

Keywords: exchange; trust; reciprocity; cooperation; clustering; bargaining; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Date: 2004-03-31
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Sustaining cooperation in trust games (2006) Downloads
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