Comunicación indirecta en situaciones de soborno y amenaza

Indirect communication in bribery and threatening situations

Fernando Estrada

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explain the relevance of the theory of indirect communication strategy and negotiating conflict. Based on Thomas Schelling illustrates indirect communication cases: bribery and threats. It shows that both bribery and threats are rational preference mechanisms, whose functions can be expressed in non-linear diagrams. This analysis also contributes to the theory of strategic games very different from zero. Indirect communication is a fundamental basis for strategic action in various forms of conflict, from war to irregular traffic jams caused by vehicular traffic. Our particular interest in the bribery and the threat is related to common cases in the colombian conflict.

Keywords: Strategy of Conflict; indirect communication; negotiation; bribery; threats; indirect speech acts. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Comunicación indirecta en situaciones de soborno y amenaza (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:20070

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