Quantum mechanism helps agents combat Pareto-inefficient social choice rules

Haoyang Wu ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Quantum strategies have been successfully applied in game theory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this paper, we generalize the classical theory of mechanism design to a quantum domain and obtain two results: 1) We find that the mechanism in the proof of Maskin's sufficiency theorem is built on the Prisoners' Dilemma. 2) By virtue of a quantum mechanism, agents who satisfy a certain condition can combat Pareto-inefficient social choice rules instead of being restricted by the traditional mechanism design theory.

Keywords: Quantum games; Mechanism design; Implementation theory; Nash implementation; Maskin monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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