Details about Haoyang Wu
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| Phone: | 86-18621753457 |
| Postal address: | Room 301, Building 3, 718 WuYi Road Shanghai, 200051 China |
Access statistics for papers by Haoyang Wu.
Last updated 2019-02-24. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pwu94
Working Papers
2018
- Generalizing mechanism design theory to a case where agents' types are adjustable
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
- The revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of agents are costly
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2018)
2016
- A Bayesian implementable social choice function cannot be implemented by a direct mechanism
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2012
- Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2011
- A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- On amending the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (5)
- Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
- Quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Subgame perfect implementation: A new result
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
2010
- A classical algorithm to break through Maskin's theorem for small-scale cases
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Quantum mechanism helps agents combat Pareto-inefficient social choice rules
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Two examples to break through classical theorems on Nash implementation with two agents
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
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