Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle

Haoyang Wu ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world. More importantly, we find that the revelation principle is not always right by using the quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms.

Keywords: Quantum game theory; Mechanism design; Bayesian implementation; Revelation principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35658/1/MPRA_paper_35658.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:30653

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