A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation

Ismail Saglam

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper shows that in an incomplete information situation if the set of states of the society which occur with positive probability satisfies 'connection' condition, then closure condition will be satisfied by all social choice sets. It then follows from Jackson's (1991) two fundamental theorems that whenever 'connection' holds and there are at least three agents in the society, for the implementability of social choice sets in Bayesian equilibrium, incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity conditions are both necessary and sufficient in economic environments whereas incentive compatibility and monotonicity-no-veto conditions are sufficient in noneconomic environments.

Keywords: Bayesian implementation; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7253/1/MPRA_paper_7253.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation (2008)
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