A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation

Ismail Saglam

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 3, issue 55, 1-8

Abstract: This note shows that in an incomplete information situation the closure condition will be satisfied by all social choice sets if and only if the set of states of the society which all agents believeoccur with positive probability satisfies the `connection' condition.It then follows from Jackson''s [1] fundamental theorems that whenever `connection'' is satisfied and there are at least three agents in the society, for the implementability of social choice sets in Bayesian equilibrium the incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity conditions are both necessary and sufficient in economic environments. It also follows that the incentive compatibility and monotonicity-no-veto conditions are sufficient in noneconomic environments.

Keywords: Bayesian; implementation; incomplete; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2008/Volume3/EB-08C70016A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08c70016

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().