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Ambiguous Information and Market Entry: An Experimental Study

Jordi Brandts and Lan Yao

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study experimentally how entry into a market with uncertain capacity is affected by the type of information potential entrants have available. Our focus is on behavior in a two-market entry game. In the risky information market there are two possible market capacities, both known to occur with probability 1/2. In the ambiguous information market the two possible market capacities effectively occur with probability 1/2 but participants are only told that there is uncertainty about capacities. We find that average entry is higher under ambiguous information than under risky information. To control for comparison effects and the effects of strategic interaction in the two market environment we also study a two-lottery individual decision problem and one market entry games with ambiguous and risky information. For these two cases the experimental results show no difference between information conditions. Our results are consistent with the notion that complex strategic interaction leads to higher market entry under ambiguous information.

Keywords: Market entry games; Experiment; Risk; Ambiguity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D81 L1 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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