Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness

Meixing Dai ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative.

Keywords: Multiplicative uncertainty; optimal degree of conservativeness; Brainard conservatism; central bank transparency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06, Revised 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cis, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economics Bulletin no.3.Vol. 3(2010): pp. 1720-1726

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Journal Article: Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28548

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