Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness

Meixing Dai ()

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 3, 1720-1726

Abstract: This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative.

Keywords: Multiplicative uncertainty; optimal degree of conservativeness; Brainard conservatism; central bank transparency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00277

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