Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment

Charles Noussair, Daan van Soest and Jan Stoop ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation.

Keywords: Field experiment; public goods game; social preferences; punishment; reward (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cis, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Journal Article: Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:34067

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