Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment

Charles Noussair, Daan van Soest and Jan Stoop ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 45, issue 3, 537-559

Abstract: We report the results of a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase the average level of cooperation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0841-8

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