Chinese Firms’ Political Connection, Ownership, and Financing Constraints
Isabel K. Yan,
Kenneth Chan () and
Vinh Q.T. Dang
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We empirically examine some listed Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints. Politically-connected firms display no financing constraints whereas firms without connection experience significant constraints. Non-connected family-controlled firms bear greater constraints than non-connected state-owned firms.
Keywords: Political connection; investments; financing constraints; Chinese firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 G18 E22 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-tra
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Journal Article: Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:35221
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