Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints
Kenneth Chan (),
Vinh Q.T. Dang and
Kit Ming Yan ()
Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 2, 164-167
We empirically examine some listed Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints. Politically-connected firms display no financing constraints whereas firms without connection experience significant constraints. Non-connected family-controlled firms bear greater constraints than non-connected state-owned firms.
Keywords: Political connection; Ownership; Investment; Financing constraints; Chinese firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 G31 G18 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Chinese Firms’ Political Connection, Ownership, and Financing Constraints (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:164-167
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