Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints

Kenneth Chan, Vinh Q.T. Dang and Kit Ming Yan

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 2, 164-167

Abstract: We empirically examine some listed Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints. Politically-connected firms display no financing constraints whereas firms without connection experience significant constraints. Non-connected family-controlled firms bear greater constraints than non-connected state-owned firms.

Keywords: Political connection; Ownership; Investment; Financing constraints; Chinese firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 G18 G31 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Chinese Firms’ Political Connection, Ownership, and Financing Constraints (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:164-167

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.008

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