Essential stability for large generalized games

Sofia Correa and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players, where only a finite number of them are atomic. Given any set of generalized games continuously parameterized by a complete metric space, we analyze the robustness of equilibria to perturbations on parameters.

Keywords: Essential equilibria; Essential sets and components; Generalized games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36625/1/MPRA_paper_36625.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48137/1/MPRA_paper_48137.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Essential Stability for Large Generalized Games (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:36625

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