Essential Stability for Large Generalized Games

Sofía Correa and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Working Papers from University of Chile, Department of Economics

Abstract: We address essential stability properties of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players, where only a finite number of them are atomic. Given any set of generalized games continuously parameterized by a complete metric space, we analyze the robustness of equilibria to perturbations on parameters. As an application of our results, we show that essential stability can provide a rationale for electoral participation of politically engaged individuals.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Essential stability for large generalized games (2012)
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