A framework of coopetitive games:applications to the Greek crisis

Daniele Schiliro' and David Carfì ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive game. We shall apply this analytical model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) to the Greek crisis, while conceiving this game theory model at a macro level. We construct two realizations of such model, trying to represent possible realistic macro-economic scenarios of the Germany-Greek strategic interaction. We shall suggest - after a deep and complete study of the two samples - feasible transferable utility solutions in a properly coopetitive perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in the euro area.

Keywords: Euro area; macroeconomc policy; competition; cooperation; coopetition; normal form games games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 F40 F41 F42 O52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A framework of coopetitite games: an application to the Greek crisis (2012)
Working Paper: A framework of coopetitive games: applications to the Greek crisis (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:37855

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