A framework of coopetitive games: applications to the Greek crisis
David Carfì () and
Daniele Schiliro'
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
In the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive game. We shall apply this analytical model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) to the Greek crisis, while conceiving this game theory model at a macro level. We construct two realizations of such model, trying to represent possible realistic macroeconomic scenarios of the Germany-Greek strategic interaction. We shall suggest - after a deep and complete study of the two samples - feasible transferable utility solutions in a properly coopetitive perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in the euro area.
Keywords: Games and economics; competition; cooperation; coopetition; Greek Crisis; Eurozone economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 E60 F45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations:
Published in AAPP|Atti della Accademia Peloritana dei Pericolanti Classe di Scienze Fisiche, Matematiche e Naturali No. 1, A1.90(2012): pp. 1-32
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78089/1/MPRA_paper_78089.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: A framework of coopetitive games:applications to the Greek crisis (2012) 
Working Paper: A framework of coopetitite games: an application to the Greek crisis (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:78089
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