How a fast lane may replace a congestion toll

Mogens Fosgerau

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper considers a congested bottleneck. A fast lane reserves a more than proportional share of capacity to a designated group of travelers. Travelers are otherwise identical and other travelers can use the reserved capacity when it would otherwise be idle. The paper shows that such a fast lane is always Pareto improving under Nash equilibrium in arrival times at the bottleneck and inelastic demand. It can replicate the arrival schedule and queueing outcomes of a toll that optimally charges a constant toll during part of the demand peak. Within some bounds, the fast lane scheme is still welfare improving when demand is elastic.

Keywords: Congestion; Tolling; Bottleneck; Scheduling; Fast lane (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg and nep-tre
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Journal Article: How a fast lane may replace a congestion toll (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:42271

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