Inter-jurisdictional migration and the size of government

Michele G. Giuranno and Rongili Biswas ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper develops a model of centralized public spending where decision-makers are the regional median voters instead of the national median voter of the received literature. Regional representatives decide the level of public spending by bargaining in the central legislature. We study how exogenous changes in the composition of the regional electorate either deteriorate or mitigate inter-jurisdictional redistributive conflicts and how these, in turn, influence the size of the government. We find the conditions under which migration-induced inter-regional income convergence (divergence) leads either to a bigger or a smaller government. Finally, the relationship between migration and efficiency is explored within the present framework.

Keywords: Demographic Changes; Government Spending; Inequality; Redistribution; Bargaining; Political Economy Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D78 H00 H41 H50 R1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-mig, nep-pbe, nep-pol, nep-pub and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:42604

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