EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Institutions as game theory outcomes: toward a cognitive-experimental inquiry

Angela Ambrosino ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper investigates two different approaches to the analysis of institutions using game theory and discusses their methodological and theoretical implications for further research. Starting from von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory, we investigate how game theory has been applied to the analysis of institutions, these being considered, as in Hayek (1967, 1988a) as the unplanned outcomes of self-interested individual behavior. We focus on Schotter’s (1981) and Schelling’s (1960) alternative approaches. The different ways in which these authors use von Neumann and Morgenstern’s concepts of coalition and indeterminacy of solutions play an important role in explaining the spontaneous emergence of institutions from interaction. We argue that this issue is also of importance in explaining how Schotter and Schelling’s theories fit with the main features of Hayek's theory of institutions.

Keywords: Institutions; Game Theory; Cognition; Hayek; Schotter; Schelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B40 B31 B52 B20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hme, nep-hpe and nep-neu
Date: 2009, Revised 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in International Journal of Management, Economics and Social Sciences 2.2(2012): pp. 129-150

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42752/1/MPRA_paper_42752.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:42752

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2018-08-12
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:42752