Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
Masahiro Kumabe and
H. Reiju Mihara
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
It was shown earlier that the class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura’s theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable simple games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.
Keywords: Voting games; infinitely many players; recursion theory; Turingcomputability; computable manuals and contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C69 C71 D71 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/437/1/MPRA_paper_437.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3296/1/MPRA_paper_3296.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4403/1/MPRA_paper_4403.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6803/1/MPRA_paper_6803.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:437
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().