Details about H. Reiju Mihara

Access statistics for papers by H. Reiju Mihara.

Last updated 2024-02-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pmi193

Working Papers

2017

1. Characterizing the Borda ranking rule for a fixed population
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (7)

2008

2. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2011) View citations (3) (2011)
3. The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article THE SECOND-PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMON'S DILEMMA, The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association (2012) View citations (3) (2012)

2007

4. The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2008) View citations (5) (2008)

2006

5. Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2008) View citations (6) (2008)
6. Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2011) View citations (1) (2011)

2004

7. Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
   Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (9)
8. Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice
   Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
9. Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
   Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany
   See also Journal Article Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2000) View citations (12) (2000)
10. Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof
    Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2001) View citations (10) (2001)
11. Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
    Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (5)
    See also Journal Article Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2004) View citations (5) (2004)

1998

12. Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras
    Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany
    See also Journal Article Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (1997) View citations (18) (1997)
13. Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability
    Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
    Also in Working Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research (1994)
    See also Journal Article Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability, Economic Theory, Springer (1997) View citations (19) (1997)

Journal Articles

2012

1. THE SECOND-PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMON'S DILEMMA
   The Japanese Economic Review, 2012, 63, (3), 420-429 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma, MPRA Paper (2008) View citations (1) (2008)

2011

2. Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
   Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47, (2), 150-158 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities, MPRA Paper (2006) View citations (3) (2006)
3. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 72, (1), 187-201 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction, MPRA Paper (2008) View citations (1) (2008)

2008

4. Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
   Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, 44, (3-4), 348-366 View citations (6)
   See also Working Paper Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core, MPRA Paper (2006) View citations (3) (2006)
5. The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 31, (4), 621-640 View citations (5)
   See also Working Paper The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games, MPRA Paper (2007) View citations (1) (2007)

2004

6. Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
   Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 329-341 View citations (5)
   See also Working Paper Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games, Game Theory and Information (2004) View citations (5) (2004)

2001

7. Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 543-553 View citations (10)
   See also Working Paper Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof, Public Economics (2004) View citations (1) (2004)

2000

8. Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (3), 393-402 View citations (12)
   See also Working Paper Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives, Public Economics (2004) (2004)

1999

9. Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators1
   Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999, 32, (3), 267-287 View citations (9)

1997

10. Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1997, 14, (4), 503-512 View citations (18)
    See also Working Paper Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras, Public Economics (1998) (1998)
11. Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability
    Economic Theory, 1997, 10, (2), 257-276 View citations (19)
    See also Working Paper Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability, Public Economics (1998) View citations (2) (1998)