Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
H. Reiju Mihara
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper investigates algorithmic computability of simple games (voting games). It shows that (i) games with a finite carrier are computable, (ii) computable games have both finite winning coalitions and cofinite losing coalitions, and (iii) computable games violate any conceivable notion of anonymity, including finite anonymity and measurebased anonymity. The paper argues that computable games are excluded from the intuitive class of "nice" infinite games, employing the notion of "insensitivity"-equal treatment of any two coalitions that differ only on a finite set.
Keywords: Voting games; infinitely many players; ultrafilters; recursion theory; Turing computability; finite carriers; finite winning coalitions; algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 C69 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2003-10-31, Revised 2004-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-mfd
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Mac OS X; pages: 15; To appear in Mathematical Social Sciences figures: None
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Journal Article: Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0310006
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