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Characterizing the Borda ranking rule for a fixed population

H. Reiju Mihara

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A ranking rule (social welfare function) for a fixed population assigns a social preference to each profile of preferences. The rule satisfies "Positional Cancellation" if changes in the relative positions of two alternatives that cancel each other do not alter the social preference between the two. I show that the Borda rule is the only ranking rule that satisfies "Reversal" (a weakening of neutrality), "Positive Responsiveness," and "Pairwise Cancellation."

Keywords: Borda rule; Borda count; scoring rules; positional rules; axiomatic characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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