Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice
Norbert Brunner and
H. Reiju Mihara
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Norbert Brunner: U. Bodenkultur
Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Applying Weglorz' models of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social welfare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying "finite discrimination", if and only if in Weglorz' model there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals.
Keywords: Arrow impossibility theorem; anonymity; ecological welfare functions; axiomatic set theory; ultrafilters; Weglorz's models; permutation models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02-02, Revised 2004-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: Mathematical Logic Quarterly (2000) 46: 335-359
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9902001
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