Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice

Norbert Brunner and H. Reiju Mihara
Additional contact information
Norbert Brunner: U. Bodenkultur

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Applying Weglorz' models of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social welfare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying "finite discrimination", if and only if in Weglorz' model there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals.

Keywords: Arrow impossibility theorem; anonymity; ecological welfare functions; axiomatic set theory; ultrafilters; Weglorz's models; permutation models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02-02, Revised 2004-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: Mathematical Logic Quarterly (2000) 46: 335-359
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/9902/9902001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9902001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).