Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
H. Reiju Mihara
Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, issue 3, 543-553
This paper gives a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice function for countably infinite societies. The function is defined for those profiles such that for each alternative, the coalition that prefers it the most is "describable." The "describable" coalitions are assumed to form a countable Boolean algebra. The paper discusses oligarchical characteristics of the function, employing a specific interpretation of an infinite society. The discussion clarifies within a single framework a connection between the negative result (the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem) for finite societies and the positive result for infinite ones.
Note: Received: 10 August 1998/Accepted: 29 February 2000
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Working Paper: Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof (2004)
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