# Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability

*H. Reiju Mihara*

*Economic Theory*, 1997, vol. 10, issue 2, 257-276

**Abstract:**
A social welfare function for a denumerable society satisfies Pairwise Computability if for each pair (x,y) of alternatives, there exists an algorithm that can decide from any description of each profile on {x,y} whether the society prefers x to y. I prove that if a social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence also satisfies Pairwise Computability, then it is dictatorial. This result severely limits on practical grounds Fishburn's resolution (1970) of Arrow's impossibility. I also give an interpretation of a denumerable "society."

**JEL-codes:** D71 C69 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

**Date:** 1997

**Note:** Received: April 14, 1995; revised version August 29, 1996

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**Related works:**

Working Paper: Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability (1998)

Working Paper: Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability (1994)

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