Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives

H. Reiju Mihara

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy "tops only". That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the third, . . . , or the least. The functions are defined on the domain of profiles measurable with respect to a Boolean algebra of coalitions. The unrestricted domain of profiles is an example of such a domain. I also prove an extension theorem.

Keywords: Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; dominant strategy implementation; social choice functions; infinitely large societies; tops only (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-04-24, Revised 2004-06-01
Note: Social Choice and Welfare (2000) 17: 393-402
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Journal Article: Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives (2000)
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