Parchment, guns, and the problem of governance

Giampaolo Garzarelli and Matthew J. Holian

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The genuine problem of governance is one that pays equal attention to both incentive and knowledge issues in private and public contexts. This work brings together Austrian, Public Choice and theory of the firm insights to address such problem. By taking into account incentives and knowledge, it proposes a framework that accommodates comparisons not just of kind (firm or market), but also of degree (e.g., among different types of internal organization). Moreover, although the suggested framework derives from considerations about private governance, it equally accommodates public and private settings.

Keywords: Governance; Political Economy; Rent Creation; Rent Seeking; Theory of the Firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 H00 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-17
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Related works:
Journal Article: Parchment, guns, and the problem of governance (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:43724

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