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Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments.

Keywords: Implementation; Nash equilibrium; social choice correspondences; partial honesty; Condition μ*. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C72 D7 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03, Revised 2013-07-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48234/1/MPRA_paper_48234.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2013) Downloads
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