Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara ()

Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 70, issue 3, No 10, 904 pages

Abstract: Abstract A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”, to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of $$ n\ge 3$$ n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the (unanimous) social choice rules that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. When all individuals are partially-honest, then any (unanimous) rule is partially-honestly Nash implementable. An account of the welfare implications of partially-honest Nash implementation is provided in a variety of environments.

Keywords: Nash implementation; Pure strategy Nash equilibrium; Partial honesty; Condition $$\mu ^{*}$$ μ ∗ (ii) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2018)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2018)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2017)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (2017)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization (2013)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2013)
Working Paper: Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01233-4

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