Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups

Roman Sheremeta

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the group Pareto dominant equilibrium.

Keywords: contest; between-group competition; within-group competition; asymmetry; coordination; free-riding; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C91 C92 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups (2011)
Working Paper: Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:52105

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