Imitative Behavior and Evolutionary Dynamics for the Comparative Advantage of International Trade Theory

Elvio Accinelli Gamba and Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We claim that economic agents driven by imitative behavior may impact the industrial specialization of national economies. We use a simple two-country model, where workers and firms decide to be skilled (or unskilled) and innovative (or non-innovative). We show that comparative advantages and international trade, under the assumption of a rational strategic behavior of the economic agents, can lead countries towards either an equilibrium with high-social performance or a poverty trap.

Keywords: Imitation theory and games; population games; trade strategy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-int
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Published in Políticas Públicas 1.2(2014): pp. 83-94

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