Britain's electricity capacity auctions: lessons from Colombia and New England

David Harbord and Marco Pagnozzi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The jury is still out on the need for government-organized capacity markets in order to achieve efficient long-run investments in electricity generation. When new capacity markets are introduced, however, it is important that they are well designed and take account of existing experience and previous design failures. Experience in both Colombia and New England provide a stark warning about the dangers of placing descending clock auctions at the center of electricity capacity markets. Among alternative auction design options, a sealed-bid auction is a better choice.

Keywords: Capacity markets; auctions; New England; Colombia; UK (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L5 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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