The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Charles Holt, Andrew Kydd, Laura Razzolini () and Roman Sheremeta

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more reliable attacker types more frequently, whereas the attackers tend to send less reliable types. Data from laboratory experiments with financially motivated human subjects are consistent with the qualitative patterns predicted by theory. However, we also find several interesting behavioral deviations from the theory.

Keywords: terrorism; profiling; game theory; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:56508

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