Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement

Jose Alcalde and Antonio Romero-Medina
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper provides an `escape route' from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice problem. We achieve our objective by presenting a weak notion of fairness, called τ-fairness, which is always satisfied by some allocation. Then, we propose the adoption of the Student Optimal Compensating Exchange mechanism, a procedure that assigns a τ-fair allocation to each problem. We further identify a condition on students' preferences guaranteeing incentive compatibility of this mechanism.

Keywords: School Choice Problem; Fair Matching; Top Dominance Condition; Strategy-Proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62831/1/MPRA_paper_62831.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fair student placement (2017)
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement (2015)
Working Paper: Fair School Placement (2011)
Working Paper: Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem (2011)
Working Paper: On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:62831

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