Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement

Jose Alcalde and Antonio Romero-Medina
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Antonio Romero-Medina: Departamento de Economía, Postal: Universidad Carlos III, Calle Madrid 126, Getafe , 28903 Madrid, Spain
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

No 14-1, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: This paper provides an ‘escape route’ from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice problem. We achieve our objective by presenting a weak notion of fairness, called τ-fairness, which is always satisfied by some allocation. Then, we propose the adoption of the Student Optimal Compensating Exchange mechanism, a procedure that assigns a τ-fair allocation to each problem. We further identify a condition on students’ preferences guaranteeing incentive compatibility of this mechanism.

Keywords: School Choice Problem; Fair Matching; Strategy-Proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2014-02-13, Revised 2015-03-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://web.ua.es/es/dmcte/documentos/qmetwp1401.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement (2015)
Working Paper: On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems (2011)
Working Paper: Fair School Placement (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2014_001

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