Incentives and justice for sequencing problems

Manipushpak Mitra and Parikshit De

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We address the mechanism design issue for the sequencing problem. We identify the just sequencing rule that serves the agents in the non-increasing order of their waiting costs and prove that it is a Rawlsian rule. We identify all rVCG mechanisms that implement the just sequencing rule. The other properties of the just sequencing rule that we identify are the following. It is an affine cost minimizer. It can be implemented with budget balanced rVCG mechanisms. Finally, when waiting cost and processing time are private information, we identify all generalized rVCG mechanisms that ex-post implement the just sequencing rule.

Keywords: sequencing; implementation; outcome efficient sequencing rule; just sequencing rule; budget balance; ex-post implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65447/1/MPRA_paper_65447.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92865/1/MPRA_paper_65447.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives and justice for sequencing problems (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:65447

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