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Incentives and justice for sequencing problems

Parikshit De () and Manipushpak Mitra
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Parikshit De: Indian Statistical Institute

Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 64, issue 2, No 2, 239-264

Abstract: Abstract We address the mechanism design issue for the sequencing problem. We identify the just sequencing rule that serves the agents in the non-increasing order of their waiting costs and prove that it is a Rawlsian rule and that it weakly lexi-max cost dominates the outcome efficient sequencing rule. We identify all ICJ mechanisms that implement the just sequencing rule. The other properties of the just sequencing rule that we identify are the following. It can be implemented with budget-balanced ICJ mechanisms. When waiting cost and processing time are private information, we identify all generalized ICJ mechanisms that ex-post implement the just sequencing rule. Finally, we identify all budget-balanced generalized ICJ mechanisms.

Keywords: Sequencing; Implementation; Outcome efficient sequencing rule; Just sequencing rule; Budget balance; Ex-post implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0983-2

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