Leadership with Individual Rewards and Punishments

Özgür Gürerk, Thomas Lauer and Martin Scheuermann

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In a public goods experiment, leaders with reward or punishment power induce higher team cooperation compared to leader-free teams without any reward or punishment possibilities. When equipped with reward or punishment instruments, however, leader-free teams perform as well as teams with leaders.We conclude that the instruments as such are more effective in fostering cooperation than a leader.

Keywords: Leadership; Public Goods; Punishment; Reward (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65691/1/MPRA_paper_65691.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74299/28/MPRA_paper_74299.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80413/1/MPRA_paper_80413.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/85387/8/MPRA_paper_85387.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Leadership with individual rewards and punishments (2018)
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