Profiling, screening and criminal recruitment

Christopher Cotton and Cheng Li

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We model major criminal activity as a game in which a law enforcement officer chooses the rate at which to screen different population groups, and a criminal organization (e.g. drug cartel, terrorist cell) chooses the observable characteristics of its recruits. Our model best describes smuggling or terrorism activities at borders, airports and other security checkpoints. The most effective law enforcement policy imposes only moderate restrictions on the officer's ability to profile. In contrast to models of decentralized crime, requiring equal treatment never improves the effectiveness of law enforcement.

Keywords: racial profiling; law enforcement; national security; smuggling; terrorism; crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 H56 J78 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66127/1/MPRA_paper_66127.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Profiling, Screening, and Criminal Recruitment (2015)
Working Paper: Profiling, Screening and Criminal Recruitment (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:66127

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