Profiling, Screening, and Criminal Recruitment

Christopher Cotton and Cheng Li

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 17, issue 6, 964-985

Abstract: We model major criminal activity as a game in which a law enforcement officer chooses the rate at which to screen different population groups, and a criminal organization (e.g., drug cartel, terrorist cell) chooses the observable characteristics of its recruits. Our model best describes smuggling or terrorism activities at borders, airports, and other security checkpoints. The most effective law enforcement policy imposes only moderate restrictions on the officer's ability to profile. In contrast to models of decentralized crime, requiring equal treatment never improves the effectiveness of law enforcement.

Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Profiling, screening and criminal recruitment (2013)
Working Paper: Profiling, Screening and Criminal Recruitment (2012)
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